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Summary
Psychologists have noticed an interesting regularity, consisting in 
people being more willing to help ‘identified victims’ than ‘statisti-
cal victims’ (this regularity has been called ‘the identifiable victim 
effect’). One of the controversial problems connected with this effect 
is a normative one, viz. can preferring identified victims be justified 
in the contexts of private decisions (i.e., made by ‘private’ citizens 
rather than public institutions)? The goal of this article is to defend 
three claims: (1) that the answer to the above normative question 
depends on two factors: the strength of the identified victims effect 
and the assumed view (utilitarian or non-utilitarian) on the norma-
tive status of helping; (2) that the proper view is one of the variants 
of the non-utilitarian approach (referred to in the paper as ‘negative 
morality with elements of positive-partial morality’); (3) that (with 
the exception of the strong variant of the identified victim effect) 
preferring identified victims is not morally improper.
Keywords: identified victim, statistical victim, obligation to help, 
utilitarianism, imperfect duty, supererogation
Streszczenie
Psychologowie zaobserwowali interesującą prawidłowość polegającą 
na tym, że ludzie chętniej udzielają pomocy ofiarom zidentyfikowa-
nym niż tzw. ofiarom statystycznym (prawidłowość ta została na-
zwana „efektem ofiary zidentyfikowanej”). Jedną z kontrowersyj-
nych kwestii wiążących się z tym efektem jest kwestia normatywna: 
czy preferowanie ofiary zidentyfikowanej w kontekście prywatnych 
decyzji (to jest podejmowanych przez prywatnych obywateli, a nie 
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instytucje publiczne) daje się moralnie uzasadnić? Celem niniejsze-
go artykułu jest obrona trzech tez: (1) że odpowiedź na powyższe 
pytanie normatywne zależy od dwóch czynników: siły efektu ofiary 
zidentyfikowanej oraz przyjętego poglądu (utylitarystycznego lub 
nieutylitarystycznego) na temat normatywnego statusu pomaga-
nia; (2) że właściwym poglądem jest jeden z wariantów stanowiska 
nieutylitarystycznego; (3) że (z wyjątkiem silnego wariantu efektu 
ofiary zidentyfikowanej) preferowanie osób zidentyfikowanych nie 
jest moralnie niewłaściwe.
Słowa kluczowe: ofiara zidentyfikowana, ofiara statystyczna, obo-
wiązek pomagania, utylitaryzm, obowiązek niedoskonały, super-
erogacja
1. The identified victim effect: controversial issues
Psychological research on moral decision-making has re-
vealed that human beings are more willing to help ‘identified’ 
victims than ‘statistical’ ones (cf., e.g., Schelling 1968; Jen-
ni and Loewenstein 1997; Kogut and Ritov 2005; Small and 
Loewenstein 2003; Small 2015). This phenomenon is called 
the ‘identified victim effect’ (hereafter: IVE). For at least two 
reasons, however, the meaning of this effect remains unclear. 
The first reason is connected to the fact that the key concepts 
used to describe this effect – those of identified and statistical 
victims – are not entirely clear. But it must be admitted that 
the problem here is not very serious: it mainly concerns the 
question of how strongly ‘concretized’ (personalized) the vic-
tim must be (i.e., the person needing help) in order that she 
may be called ‘identified’. A spectrum of approaches can be 
distinguished here: from the minimalistic, which allows one 
to speak of identification at the moment when the victim is 
simply ‘named’, to the maximalist, which assumes that the 
victim must be described – concretized – in substantial detail, 
by more than merely naming. The second reason, which is, in 
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my view, more serious, is that in the relevant literature (see, 
e.g., Cohen, Daniels, and Eyal 2015) scarce attention, if any, 
is paid to the fact that one can distinguish different variants 
of IVE according to the strength of the preference for identi-
fied victims. I shall argue that the question of the strength 
of IVE is strictly connected with one of the crucial norma-
tive questions which may be – and is – posed in the context of 
reflection on IVE, viz. the question of whether a preference 
for identified victims can be morally justified (this question 
should be distinguished from a different normative question, 
or, rather, a normative-instrumental question, viz. of how one 
can make use of IVE in order to make public decisions regard-
ing the distribution of resources more effective). In this ar-
ticle I shall argue for the claim that such preference can be 
morally justified, and whether it is justified depends on two 
factors: the strength of IVE and – above all – the accepted 
view on the moral status of helping. Let me clarify in what 
regards my analysis of the moral admissibility of preference 
for identified victims will differ from the analyses of this nor-
mative question pursued in the relevant literature (cf. e.g., 
Hare 2012; Daniels 2012; Frick 2015; Żuradzki 2018). The 
first difference, already mentioned, is that I shall put a great 
deal of stress on the question of how the strength of IVE may 
influence the way in which the problem of the moral admis-
sibility of a preference for identified victims is resolved. The 
second (crucial) one concerns the method of my normative 
analysis. I shall not be applying various ethical theories (e.g., 
contractualism, utilitarianism) directly to the moral dilemmas 
in which help can be given to identified or statistical victims to 
see whether any of these theories may justify IVE (this seems 
to be a common feature of the analyses pursued in the arti-
cles cited above, which, of course, differ from each other in 
many other respects), but, rather, I shall reconstruct various 
theories on the moral status of helping, and only subsequently 
shall I apply them to the question of the moral admissibility of 
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a preference for identified victims. My approach is therefore 
indirect: I do not assume that helping is a duty, but rather, 
I want to analyze its moral status and its implications for the 
question about the moral admissibility of preference for iden-
tified victims. 
I shall begin my analysis by distinguishing three variants 
of IVE: the weak, the moderate, and the strong. I propose the 
following definitions thereof. Assume that an agent possess-
es a certain amount (M) of money which she can allocate to 
helping either identified or statistical victims. Now, the weak 
IVE consists in the fact that when there is a choice between 
helping a given number of identified victims and the same 
number of statistical victims, she decides to help the identified 
victims, but if the number of both types of victims is different, 
she decides to help those victims who form a more numerous 
group (it is assumed that she can help either one group or the 
other, and thereby cannot distribute money between them). 
The moderate IVE differs from the weak one in that the agent 
prefers to help the identified victims also when the number 
of statistical victims is larger, on condition that the difference 
between the number of the statistical victims and the identified 
ones is not great (if it is great, she decides to help the statisti-
cal victims). The above definition of the moderate IVE is not 
completely precise, because it does not provide a quantitative 
definition of the ‘threshold’ difference between the number 
of statistical and identified victims which makes the agent re-
verse her preference (in favor of statistical victims). However, 
this lack of precision seems innocuous, at least in the context 
of the normative analyses to be pursued in this paper; for the 
goal of these analyses, the somewhat vague statement that the 
‘threshold’ difference cannot be great will be sufficient. The 
strong IVE entails that the agent always, i.e., irrespective of 
the number of both groups, prefers to help the identified vic-
tims. Now, the psychological research seems to confirm only 
the existence of the weak and the moderate IVE. But let me 
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emphasize that the ‘psychological reality’ is of secondary im-
portance in the context of my analyses: their goal is to exam-
ine the moral justification of various possible variants of IVE 
(on the assumption that the crucial variable for ascertaining 
whether IVE is morally justified is the accepted view on the 
moral status of helping). 
At the end of these introductory remarks two addition-
al clarifications need to be made. Firstly, my analysis of the 
moral status of a preference for identified victims refers only 
to private decisions, i.e., to decisions made by individuals in 
their ‘private sphere’. The conclusions might be different 
if the analysis were pursued in the context of public deci-
sions (made by legal or social institutions which have been 
designed to realize various kinds of helping/beneficent/sup-
portive goals). For instance, the utilitarian view – which will 
be criticized in this paper, and which leads to a moral cri-
tique of IVE – might be apt in the context of public decisions, 
and therefore IVE might not be morally justified in public 
decision-making. Secondly, I omit analysis of a certain type 
of private decisions to help, viz. decisions about urgent help-
ing. Imagine that agent A can save agent B’s life at relatively 
little cost to herself, and is the only person, or one of a few 
persons, who can do it. A’s help is then urgent. I shall not an-
alyze this special kind of helping for two reasons: there is no 
doubt that in such situations helping is a duty (according to 
all reasonable moral theories), and that this duty requires the 
maximization of the number of saved lives: the choice of sav-
ing a lower number of victims, just because they are identi-
fied, rather than a higher number of statistical victims, would 
be obviously morally suboptimal (though it should be added 
that the real life situations of urgent help in which a ‘private’ 
agent must choose between helping identified or statistical 
victims seem to be very rare).
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2. The views on the moral status of helping and their 
implications for the evaluation of IVE
2.1. Utilitarianism
Utilitarianism, which requires that the agent should choose 
the action which maximizes social utility, does not provide any 
grounds for the claim that there is a morally relevant, intrinsic 
difference between actions and omission, and thereby between 
helping and non-harming. In general, one can say that both 
types of deeds (helping and non-harming) are regarded as al-
ways obligatory (within rule utilitarianism) or as usually oblig-
atory (act utilitarianism). Two consequences of utilitarianism 
will be especially important for the evaluation of IVE: (1) that 
helping is an obligation; (2) that this obligation is precisely (at 
least in theory) regulated, i.e., in the case of a conflict between 
two conflicting duties to help (for instance, whether to help 
the identified victims or the statistical ones), one can always 
(at least in theory) ascertain which of them ought to be actu-
alized, viz. the duty which leads to the maximization of social 
utility; this means that all considerations that focus on aspects 
other than the ‘amount’ of the produced social utility, e.g., the 
existence of an intimate relationship, previous commitments, 
should play no independent role in the process of deciding who 
should become the beneficiary of help.
Now, the utilitarian evaluation of the moderate and strong 
IVE is that a straightforward preference for identified victims 
is in both cases immoral, as it fails to maximize social utility. 
The reason is that utilitarianism implies that our moral duty 
is not simply to help others, but to help them in a manner 
that maximizes social utility, and the requirement of the max-
imization of social utility implies that, having at one’s dispos-
al a certain amount of money (M), one should give it to the 
more numerous group of victims, since the increase in utility 
remains in direct proportion to the number of victims (on the 
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assumption that the law of decreasing marginal utility is val-
id, and that the help is identical for each victim). However, 
the above claim that, from the utilitarian point of view, strong 
and moderate variants of IVE are morally wrong, needs to be 
made somewhat more nuanced by taking into account an im-
portant distinction, viz. the distinction between utilitarianism 
as a view which provides a criterion for evaluating the conse-
quences of actions, and utilitarianism as a view which consti-
tutes not only such a criterion but also a decisional procedure. 
In the light of the first variant of utilitarianism, preference 
for an identified victim just because she is an identified vic-
tim is (in the context of the strong and moderate IVE) morally 
wrong because it tends to lead to immoral consequences, and 
not because it is a morally defective procedure (if we assumed, 
counterfactually, that preferring identified victims leads to the 
maximization of social utility, it would be morally acceptable, 
or to be more precise: morally obligatory). In the light of the 
second variant of utilitarianism, a preference for an identified 
victim just because she is an identified victim is ‘doubly wrong’ 
(in the context of the strong and moderate IVE): as a moral 
procedure and as producing sub-optimal consequences (i.e. not 
maximizing social utility). It is interesting to note that these 
two variants of utilitarianism may imply different evaluations 
of the weak IVE (i.e., one in which both groups of victims are 
equi-numerous). The first variant implies that a preference for 
identified victims is not immoral, because the consequences of 
each of the two possible decisions – to help identified victims 
or to help statistical victims – are the same (in the sense that 
they equally contribute to the increase in social utility); it is ir-
relevant here that the procedure that led to helping identified 
victims was not utilitarian, i.e., that the agent’s intention was 
not to maximize social utility. By contrast, the second variant, 
which imposes two requirements on the agent (consequential-
ist and procedural), implies that even weak IVE is immoral 
(because it violates the procedural requirement).
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2.2. Non-utilitarianism: three variants
Let me recall two utilitarian claims with respect to helping: (1) 
helping is a duty; (2) conflicts of duties to help can be resolved 
by appealing to one – and only one – criterion: that of the max-
imization of social utility; no other criterion is morally permis-
sible. Depending on the way these two claims are modified, one 
can distinguish three variants of the non-utilitarian views on 
the moral status of helping; I shall call them: negative morality 
(which, as I shall argue, may have three different varieties), 
positive-partial morality, and negative morality with elements 
of positive-partial morality. I shall successively discuss them, 
putting special stress on their implications for the moral eval-
uation of IVE.
Variant 1: Negative morality
Negative morality rejects both claims of utilitarianism (or 
more precisely: rejects the claim (1) which implies the rejec-
tion of claim (2)). The core of this morality is negative duties, 
i.e., duties of omission, including the duty to abstain from 
harming other people. Accordingly, negative morality implies 
that non-harming other people has an entirely different moral 
character from helping them: the former is obligatory, the lat-
ter is not. But the moral status of helping within negative mo-
rality needs to be described more precisely, because the mere 
statement that it is not obligatory is misleading, as it may 
suggest that helping is morally indifferent (the type of moral-
ity – one could call it purely negative – which treated helping 
as morally indifferent would be entirely implausible). But if 
helping is neither obligatory, nor non-obligatory, the question 
arises what its moral status might be. I shall distinguish three 
different interpretations of its status within negative morality 
(giving rise to three sub-variants of this view): (1) as a super-
erogatory action, (2) as a quasi-supererogatory action, or (3) as 
an imperfectly obligatory action.
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Ref. (1) (Helping as a supererogatory action). According to 
this interpretation helping is a supererogatory action in the 
sense that performing such an action deserves admiration, 
yet the failure to perform it does not entail moral condemna-
tion. 
Ref. (2) (Helping as a quasi-supererogatory action). Accord-
ing to this interpretation, helping is a quasi-supererogatory 
action in the sense that it deserves moral praise but not ad-
miration, and the failure to perform it does not entail moral 
condemnation.1
Ref. (3) (Helping as an imperfect duty). According to this 
interpretation, helping is an imperfect duty in the sense giv-
en to this notion by Kant (1964, section 53). In Kant’s view, 
helping others, like other imperfect duties (unvollkomene 
Pflichte), e.g., the duty to develop one’s capacities or charac-
ter, differ from perfect duties (vollkommene Pflichte), e.g., the 
duty to keep one’s promises, in that they leave the agent, so to 
speak, ‘double discretion’ in their performance. Firstly, they 
allow exceptions in favor of ‘inclination’, which may mean 
two different things: they have priority over egoistic goals but 
this priority is not unconditional (one can occasionally give 
1 The distinction between supererogatory and quasi-supererogato-
ry actions does not appear in the relevant literature, but introducing it 
seems to me necessary for making a distinction between admirable (he-
roic) and simply praiseworthy (but not admirable) acts (I developed this 
distinction in Załuski 2012). The standard definitions of supererogation 
(e.g., by Roderick Chisholm 1963 or James Urmson 1958) conflate these 
two similar but still different categories; for instance, in Chisholm’s defi-
nition, an act is supererogatory if its commission is good and its omission 
neutral; it therefore embraces both supererogatory and quasi-supereroga-
tory acts (as I understand them). It is worth noticing that supererogatory 
acts of helping have (on my account) necessarily greater moral worth than 
obligatory acts (omissions) (because they refer to what may be called ‘he-
roic’ helping – requiring much self-sacrifice), whereas quasi-supereroga-
tory acts of helping (which embrace also such trivial services as lending 
lecture notes to a fellow student) may have less moral worth than obliga-
tory acts (omissions).
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preference to one’s egoistic goals); or they may be limited by 
other duties (cf. Paton 1946, 148–149). Secondly, the way they 
are realized depends to a large extent on the agent: they do 
not determine exactly how they should be performed (cf. Kant 
2005, 58).
It is clear that interpretations (1) and (2) on the one hand, 
and interpretation (3) on the other are mutually exclusive, 
since an act of helping cannot be at the same time a duty, 
even if an imperfect one, as implied by interpretation (3), and 
a non-duty, as implied by interpretation (1) and (2). Interpre-
tations (1) and (2), in turn, are also, strictly speaking, mutual-
ly exclusive because, even though they assume that an act of 
helping is a non-duty, they morally evaluate it in a different 
way. But I shall analyze them jointly, which is justified precise-
ly by the fact that they treat helping as a non-duty (they are 
therefore similar in an essential respect). Thus, the question 
to be resolved is whether any of these three interpretations 
implies a moral critique of IVE.
Let me start from the easiest case – interpretation (3). 
Since this interpretation asserts explicitly that the agent 
has ‘double discretion’ in performing her (imperfect) duty of 
helping (the duty allows exceptions in favor of inclination, 
and does not determine the exact way in which it should be 
performed), one cannot morally criticize the agent for helping 
identified victims rather than statistical ones, at least in the 
context of weak and moderate IVE. As far as the strong IVE 
is concerned, the matter is less clear: one may argue that giv-
en the large disproportion between the two groups of victims, 
even an imperfect duty of helping requires giving resources 
to the larger group (that of statistical victims). As regards 
the two other interpretations (which, as mentioned, I treat 
jointly), it seems that one can assume the following axiom re-
garding supererogatory and quasi-supererogatory deeds: if an 
action is not obligatory, and therefore not enforceable, and its 
performance, even if admirable or praiseworthy, depends en-
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tirely on the agent’s good will, then one cannot formulate any 
requirement regarding the concrete form in which this action 
ought to be performed. One can advance the following argu-
ment for this axiom: by introducing an element of obligation 
into the non-obligatory (supererogatory or quasi-supereroga-
tory) action, one deprives consistency – in a twofold manner – 
of the very concept of this action: it would be at the same time 
obligatory and non-obligatory, and, consequently, even though 
the agent could not be morally criticized for not performing it, 
she could be morally criticized for performing it in a specific 
manner. This would be rather odd. A better (more consistent) 
account of a supererogatory act (and, analogously, quasi-su-
pererogatory) would be the following: an act which is super-
erogatory in the basic sense (i.e., in terms of the question of 
whether it ought to be performed) is also supererogatory in 
the secondary sense (i.e. in terms of the way it is performed). 
Now, it follows from this axiom that an agent cannot be mor-
ally criticized for helping (which is assumed to be a supererog-
atory or quasi-supererogatory action) in one way or another, 
e.g., by helping identified victims rather than statistical ones. 
The very fact that she helps is morally valuable; the way she 
helps is of no moral importance. There seem to be only two 
exceptions to this claim: the case of strong IVE, where there 
exists a large disproportion between the number of statistical 
and identified victims (the arbitrary character of choice is here 
so glaring that it cannot be morally accepted), and the case of 
urgent helping (described in section 1). It must be pointed out, 
however, that the above-mentioned axiom is not unanimously 
accepted; it was rejected by some thinkers, e.g., by Joe Horton 
(2017) and Theron Pummer (2016), who argued for the claim 
that if we are willing to perform a helping act, we should per-
form it an optimal way (the apt name for this view, proposed 
by Horton, is ‘optimific altruism’). But it seems that their 
claim that the suboptimal execution of a supererogatory act is 
morally wrong is plausible only with regard to the two cases 
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mentioned above. As a general rule, it can hardly be accepted. 
To repeat what has already been said: it would be really odd to 
morally criticize an agent for not optimally performing an act 
which goes beyond the call of duty. Of course, such an agent 
may be criticized, but the critique should be formulated on 
grounds other than moral ones, e.g., grounds of prudence or 
effectiveness. To take this one step further: there would even 
seem to be something immoral in morally criticizing an agent 
who goes beyond the call of duty but does so in a suboptimal 
way; the very fact that she goes beyond the call of duty should 
suspend moral critique of the agent (unless her way of per-
forming the supererogatory act is glaringly arbitrary).
Variant 2: Positive-partial morality
The second variant of the non-utilitarian view accepts the 
claim (1) of utilitarianism (that helping is a duty) but it rejects 
its claim (2) – that personal (‘partial’) ties should not be taken 
into account in deciding conflicts of duties to help. Therefore, 
this morality is similar to utilitarianism in two respects: it as-
sumes that helping is obligatory even if there are no special 
ties between the agents (the potential benefactor and the po-
tential beneficiary); the criterion of the maximization of so-
cial utility ought to be invoked to resolve conflicts of duties of 
help. The difference lies in that the criterion may be defeated 
by other considerations, viz. special obligations arising from 
special ties/relationships between agents. The name of the mo-
rality – positive-partial – is justified by the fact that it treats 
helping as obligatory (it therefore admits positive duties, i.e., 
duties of action), and the strength of these duties depends on 
partial factors (i.e., partial from the standpoint of utilitarian-
ism), such special ties/relationships as, e.g., family, friendship, 
nationality. In the context of the moral evaluation of IVE, this 
variant of non-utilitarian morality leads to somewhat different 
conclusions than the utilitarian view: it agrees with utilitari-
anism that a preference for identified victims just because they 
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are identified is morally unjustifiable because it is based on 
morally irrelevant grounds (even though this variant allows 
a larger set of morally relevant grounds than utilitarianism, 
it does not accept mere ‘identification’ as morally relevant). It 
also agrees with utilitarianism that in the absence of special 
relationships IVE is not justifiable. But, in contrast to utili-
tarianism, it may justify a preference for identified victims not 
because they are identified but because they satisfy some other 
(non-utilitarian) moral criteria (the existence of special ties be-
tween the benefactor and the beneficiary).
Variant 3: Negative morality with elements of positive-partial 
morality
This variant assumes that helping is obligatory only with 
regard to persons towards whom we have special obligations 
(arising from the existence of special ties/relationships); help-
ing other persons is not obligatory, but (depending on the as-
sumed sub-variant of negative morality) is supererogatory, 
quasi-supererogatory, or has the character of imperfect duty. 
Since a preference for identified victims can be immoral only 
if helping is a duty, and, in this variant, it is a duty only with 
regard to persons with whom we have special relationships, 
it follows that it (a preference for identified victims) can be 
immoral only in one situation: in which statistical victims are 
at the same time people with whom we have special relation-
ships. One may notice that even assuming that this kind of 
situation is theoretically possible (i.e., that victims with whom 
the agent has special relationships and knows about this can 
ever be called ‘statistical victims’) it is rather psychologically 
improbable that the agent will not then help the statistical 
victims.
Let me briefly summarize the main conclusions of my anal-
ysis. Preference for identified victims is, generally speaking, 
immoral only in the utilitarian account of the moral status of 
helping and (in some cases) in the positive-partial morality 
Wojciech Załuski62
(which is similar in several respects with utilitarianism); in the 
remaining views it is not immoral, or is immoral only in very 
special circumstances (the large disproportion between the 
group of statistical and identified victims). However, this leads 
to the question which of the four views of the moral status of 
helping is the correct one. It is hard to provide conclusive argu-
ments in favor of one of these views; it would require invoking 
a more general principle from which one of these views could 
be deduced, and the existence of such a principle is very dubi-
ous. It seems, however, that one can put forward two strong 
arguments in favor of negative morality with elements of posi-
tive-partial morality. The first argument asserts that this view 
is most consistent with our common moral intuitions, includ-
ing those which are encoded in most legal systems. The second 
one identifies serious defects of the utilitarian view. I shall de-
velop them in the following section.
3. Arguments for negative morality with elements of 
positive-partial morality
3.1. Argument from consistency with common moral 
intuitions, including those encoded in most legal systems
It seems that this view on the moral status of helping (viz. 
negative morality with elements of positive-partial morality) 
is presupposed by most contemporary legal systems, which are 
therefore non-utilitarian in this respect (i.e., in their view on 
the normative status of helping). Their core (at least as far 
as criminal law is concerned) consists of rules which spell out 
negative duties, i.e., duties of forbearance from wrong-doing. 
Accordingly, in contrast to utilitarianism, legal systems do not 
place non-harming and helping on the same ‘moral level’. This 
is particularly distinct in the common law systems, in which, 
generally speaking, so-called ‘good Samaritan laws’ (i.e., laws 
which penalize omissions to help a person in serious danger 
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when helping her does not expose the potential helper to the 
risk of serious harm) do not appear. It is distinct, however, also 
in the continental legal systems in which such laws usually 
exist (cf. Smits 2002).2 For such laws concern a somewhat dif-
ferent situation than the one usually discussed in the context 
of the moral status of IVE. An agent may prove to be a good or 
bad Samaritan (at least according to the legal understanding 
of these notions) only if the other person needs urgent help, 
i.e., one without which she is likely to lose her life or to sustain 
a serious harm to her health, and the agent is the only person 
who may help her, or one of a few such persons. The laws of the 
good Samaritan apply therefore to situations in which there 
arises a special tie between the needy person and the poten-
tial helper (Samaritan), and there does not arise a dilemma 
of whether the (potential) helper should help the needy (iden-
tified) person or some statistical victim. One can therefore 
say that helping in situations of this kind, even though it has 
(like every kind of help) a positive character (that of action), is 
obligatory. This is a ‘positive-partial’ element in the otherwise 
negative morality of (criminal) law (which formulates above all 
negative duties).
However, given that the morality by which we are guided 
in our everyday life has richer content than morality ‘encod-
ed’ in criminal law, one might cherish doubts as to whether 
the above argument – pointing out the consistency between 
law, on the one hand, and negative morality with elements of 
2 For instance, in the Polish legal system such a law is formulated by 
Article 162 of the Penal Code: “§ 1. Whoever does not render assistance 
to a person who is in a situation threatening an immediate danger of loss 
of life, serious bodily injury, or a serious impairment thereof, when he so 
do without exposing himself or another person to the danger of loss of 
life or serious harm to health shall be subject to the penalty of depriva-
tion of liberty for up to 3 years. § 2. Whoever does not render assistance 
necessitating the submission to a medical operation, or under conditions 
in which the prompt assistance of a responsible authority or person is 
possible, shall be deemed to have not committed an offence”.
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positive-partial morality, on the other – is really apt: is it not 
so that our everyday morality imposes on us stricter and more 
extensive duties to help? On closer analysis, however, it turns 
out that the answer to this question should be negative. It is 
no accident that we do not morally condemn persons who do 
not help others, and praise or admire those who help. The only 
exception in which such condemnation appears is the situation 
in which there is a special tie/relationship between the poten-
tial benefactor and the beneficiary. This exception is, of course, 
allowed for also in the negative morality with elements of pos-
itive-partial morality. Furthermore, it seems that in our every-
day moral practice we do not make a distinction between per-
sons who help identified victims and those who help statistical 
victims, but only between those who help others (we praise or 
admire them), and those who do not help (we do not praise or 
admire them, but also do not censure them morally). In sum: 
it seems that even taking into account a more extended set of 
our moral intuitions than those ‘encoded’ in law, one will not 
go beyond negative morality with elements of positive-partial 
morality.
3.2. Argument from the weakness of the utilitarian view
A preference for identified victims (i.e., IVE) is unequivocal-
ly immoral only on the grounds of utilitarianism. However, 
utilitarianism is open to serious – in my view, devastating – 
criticism. It was pointed out, for instance, that it suffers from 
‘schizophrenia’, because it requires that human beings be guid-
ed by a moral motive (viz. concern with ‘social utility’) which 
is not treated as valuable in our everyday moral practice; it 
therefore gives rise to a division (the aforementioned ‘schizo-
phrenia’) between reasons for action and moral motives, i.e., 
utilitarian reasons for action cannot function as plausible mor-
al motives (cf. Stocker 1976). Let me explain this somewhat 
hermetic description. A son who visits his ill father in the hos-
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pital, not because he loves him, but because he thereby wishes 
to maximize social utility (i.e., takes the utilitarian criterion 
as his moral motive), cannot count, in Stocker’s view, on be-
ing praised for his (otherwise beneficial) action: his motive is 
improper. Two remarks must be made here, however. Firstly, 
Stocker’s argument applies only to utilitarianism understood 
both as a criterion for evaluating actions and as a decisional 
procedure; it does not apply to a less restrictive, though also 
less common, version of utilitarianism understood only as 
a criterion for evaluating actions (I use here the distinction 
described in more detail in section 2.1). Secondly, it should 
be mentioned that Stocker directed his argument not only 
against utilitarianism, but more generally: against ‘modern 
ethical theories’, including e.g., Kantian ethical theory. But, 
arguably, it is strongest precisely with regard to utilitarianism: 
if the son acted in a ‘Kantian manner’, that is: if he visited his 
ill father just because (and only because) he thought it was his 
duty to do so, his motivation, though deprived of emotional as-
pect, would seem much less idiosyncratic than the motivation 
implied by utilitarianism, presumably because the connection 
between the action and its beneficiary would be less abstract/
artificial. This leads us to the next argument against utilitar-
ianism: it was criticized precisely for ignoring personal ties, 
which we treat in our everyday moral practice as important, if 
not crucial, from the standpoint of our moral duties (cf. Slote 
1985; Scheffler 2000). It was also rightly pointed out that utili-
tarianism places excessive cognitive requirements upon agents 
(for instance, in order to make a utility-maximizing decision, 
one would have to carry out – consciously or unconsciously – 
complicated calculations, which are, in fact, intractable). Fur-
thermore, by broadening the scope of our moral duties (so that 
practically each decision in our life would become a moral deci-
sion), and by prohibiting us from treating our personal ties as 
morally relevant, utilitarianism poses a threat to our personal 
‘integrity’ and identity (Williams 1973): it assumes that hu-
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man beings are just a means for the realization of an abstract 
goal, namely the maximization of social utility.
To conclude: negative morality with elements of posi-
tive-partial morality seems to provide the most plausible ac-
count of the moral status of helping. This is the status (with 
some exceptions) of non-obligation (though not of moral in-
difference). Accordingly, on the grounds of this morality one 
cannot say (contrary to what is often assumed in the literature 
devoted to IVE) that there is something irrational or immoral 
in giving preference to identified victims.
The research on this article was funded by the Ministry of Science 
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